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CHAPTER II
IMMUNITIES
In making a determination of a jurisdictional problem, it is not
enough to weigh a state's claim to assert jurisdiction in terms of
the accepted bases of jurisdiction. Claims for immunity, predi-
cated either on the status of the accused as an agent of a state or
the official character of the acts constituting the offense must also
be taken into account. A member of an armed force is an agent
of the state which he serves, and many of his acts are done in
the performance of his official duties. A common assertion is that,
as an agent of the state, he is immune from the jurisdiction of
any other state, and that in any event his acts done in the
performance of duty cannot be the basis of prosecution by any
other state. Before discussing the validity of these claims di-
rectly, a review of the situation with respect to the immunities
accorded other agents of a state is desirable. In any inquiry in
this area, however, it should be borne in mind that jurisdiction
is the norm, immunity the exception, and the existence of an
immunity must be affirmatively demonstrated. There is, more-
over, a discernible tendency to restrict the scope of even the im-
munities recognized.
The immunity of states is still widely accepted * but application
of the doctrine has been limited—in particular in the commercial
transaction field. The basis of state immunity has been attacked
on the ground that neither the equality and independence of
states nor their dignity requires they be exempt from normal
judicial processes with respect to their activities in foreign states,
especially if in areas of similar activities the state submits to the
jurisdiction of its own courts in respect to claims brought
against it.2
1 See the Comment to Article VII of the Draft Convention on the
Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, Harvard Research in
International Law, 26 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 727 (1932).
8
"Thus no legitimate claim of sovereignty is violated if the courts of a
state assume jurisdiction over a foreign state with regard to contracts
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PERSONAL IMMUNITY
Certain agents of a foreign state, notably those with diplomatic
status, enjoy personal immunity from the jurisdiction of the terri-
torial state. The fiction of extraterritoriality at one time contrib-
uted to shaping diplomatic immunities. It seems unnecessary to
point out at this juncture the many facets of the law of diplomatic
immunities which are inconsistent with such a premise. 3 This is
not to say either that there are no rules with respect to diplomatic
immunities which do not owe their origin at least in part to the
extraterritorial concept or that it is now entirely without in-
fluence. Again, respect for the sending state has been and con-
tinues to be a factor. 4 Emphasis has, however, shifted to the need
for protection of diplomats in the performance of their functions.
This is not, of course, a rule of law, but a policy consideration
concluded or torts committed in the territory of the state assuming jurisdic-
tion. On the contrary, the sovereignty, the independence, and the equality
of the latter are denied if the foreign state claims as a matter of right—as
a matter of international law—to be above the law of the state within the
territory of which it has engaged in legal transactions or committed acts
entailing legal consequences according to the law of that State." Lauter-
pacht, "The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States," 1951
Brit. Yb. Int'l. L. 220, 229. See also 1 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International
Law, 272, 273 (8th ed., 1957).
8
"The Committee does not consider that the conception of exterri-
toriality, whether regarded as a fiction or given a literal interpretation,
furnishes a satisfactory basis for practical conclusions. In its opinion, the
one solid basis for dealing with the subject is the necessity of permitting
free and unhampered exercise of the diplomatic functions and of maintaining
the dignity of the diplomatic representative and the State which he repre-
sents as the respect properly due to secular traditions." "League of Nations,
Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law,"
Questionnaire No. 3, January 1926, 20 A.J.I.L., (Spec. Supp.) 148, 149
(1926).
* "The immunities which have been conceded to the persons and things
above mentioned are prompted by considerations partly of courtesy and
partly of convenience so great as to be almost equivalent to necessity. The
head of the state, its armed forces, and its diplomatic agents are regarded
as embodying or representing its sovereignty, or in other words, its char-
acter of an equal and independent being. They symbolize something to
which deference and respect are due, and they are consequently treated with
deference and respect themselves." Hall, International Law, 218-19 (8th ed.,
Higgins, 1924). See also Pruess, "Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical
Basis of Diplomatic Immunity," 10 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 170, 182 (1932).
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which is shaping the law not only with respect to diplomats but
with respect to other officials of a state.5
There is less than complete agreement regarding which agents
of foreign states are entitled to personal immunity. The immunity
of heads of state,6 foreign ministers, 7 ambassadors and others
with diplomatic status and their families is universally recognized,
but that of the administrative and service staff of a diplomatic
mission is at best doubtful. 8 Again, a consul has no general im-
8 Comment a to Article 76 of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law,
p. 252, reads: "The most widely accepted rationale for diplomatic immunity
is that it assures governments that they will not be hampered in their
foreign relations by harassment of, or interference with, their diplomatic
representatives. Protection of the performance of diplomatic functions re-
quires that those charged with such performance not be subject to intimida-
tion by persons in the receiving state. Furthermore, states recognize that
immunity of their diplomatic personnel in other states may be conditioned
upon a reciprocal grant of immunity to such personnel of the other states."
See also Comment b to Article 77 at p. 257; Ogdon, "The Growth of Purpose
in the Law of Diplomatic Immunity," 31 A.J.I.L. 449 (1937).
6 Traditionally, the immunity is referred to as that of foreign sovereigns,
but it seems clear that it is equally available to any head of state. 1 Hyde,
International Law, 817 (2d ed. rev. 1945). See, with respect to the immunity
of a sovereign, Hall, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 220; see generally, Article 69,
Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 219.
7
"No precedents have been found dealing with the immunity of the head
of a government or that of a foreign minister, but in view of the extensive
immunity granted to diplomatic officials * * * it is to be presumed that a
foreign minister while on an official visit to the government of the terri-
torial state has an equal immunity, both as to official and as to private acts."
Reporters' Notes 1 to Article 69, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 222.
8 Article 37 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed
April 18, 1961, accords immunity to members of the administrative and
technical staff of a mission and their families, if they are not nationals of
or permanently resident in the receiving state; members of the service staff
who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving state are
accorded immunity in respect of acts performed in the course of their duties.
See also The Report of the Sub-Committee (Diena), League of Nation's
Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law,
20 A.J.I.L. (Spec. Supp.) 163 (1926) ; and Gutteridge, "Immunities of the
Subordinate Diplomatic Staff," 1947 Brit. Yb. Int'l. L. 148. Administrative
and service personnel are accorded immunity in the United States by statute
(Title 22 U.S.C., Sees, 252-54) subject to certain reservations, but in
according such immunity the United States seemingly goes beyond its obliga-
tion under international law. Articles 76 and 77 of the Restatement, Foreign
Relations Law, p. 252, 255, and Comment c to Article 76 and Comments
(e) through (g) to Article 77, p. 253 and 259-61.
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munity, but immunity only with respect to his official acts 9 or
perhaps such immunity as is necessary for the proper perform-
ance of his functions. 10 The great majority of the civilian em-
ployees of the United States do not enjoy personal immunity
when abroad.11
Personal immunity for one agent of a foreign state clearly
cannot be inferred from the existence of such immunity with re-
spect to another agent in a different category. There are abundant
reasons why this should be so. In so far as personal immunity
derives from respect for the sending state, it is relevant that the
dignity of that state is much more significantly engaged where the
agent is the Head of State, the Foreign Minister or an Ambassa-
dor than where he is a minor employee of a mission.
Diplomatic immunities in particular have a long history, which
accounts for the present scope of these immunities perhaps more
than does any theory or combination of theories, which have some-
thing of the quality of rationalization after the fact. Further, and
of more importance, the nature of a diplomat's functions 12 make
9 Article 21, Draft Convention on the Legal Position and Functions of
Consuls, Harvard Research, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 338; Beckett, "Con-
sular Immunities," 1944 Brit. Yb. Int'l. L. 34. See Lee, Consular Law and
Practice (1961) for a comprehensive treatment of the status of Consuls.
10 Article 85, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 287.
11
"Questions have been raised before this committee about the diplomatic
status of State Department and other civilian officials. In the first place,
it should be made clear that the great majority of State Department person-
nel overseas do not have immunity from local criminal jurisdiction. On the
contrary, most United States civilian officers and employees abroad, in-
cluding those of other governmental agencies, as well as the State Depart-
ment, have neither immunity nor the special guarantees provided United
States servicemen by the Status of Forces Agreement. They are completely
subject to local criminal jurisdiction, whether on duty or off duty." Deputy
Under Secretary Murphy, Hearings on H.J. Res. 309 Before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1955). See, how-
ever, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra, note 8.
12 Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra,
note 8, defines the functions of a diplomatic mission as consisting inter
alia in
:
"(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;
(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State
and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;
(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in
29
a peculiarly compelling case for personal immunity. He is not
simply physically in the country, but intimately involved with its
government. Basically, his functions are to acquire information
and to do all he legitimately can to shape attitudes and events
most favorably to his own state. To do this, he must inquire,
suggest, persuade, negotiate, and bargain; all of which involve
direct relations with the foreign government. The subtleties of
his functions make subtle pressures upon him possible, and hence
call for a maximum of protection from those pressures, even those
exerted indirectly, through his family or, perhaps, his domestic
servants. Also, the protection must be adequate to the situation in
the unfriendliest foreign country,13 and it is obviously impractical
to vary its scope depending on the prevailing climate of particular
bilateral relationships. All this suggests that protection of the
diplomatic function, without more, justifies complete personal im-
munity for diplomats and their associates. The process of ac-
creditation and particularly the right to declare a diplomat per-
sona non grata not only reflect and emphasize the nature of the
diplomat's relationship with the state to which he is accredited,
but provide something of a substitute sanction for those supplied
by the criminal law. This is not to say that there is no functional
basis for according immunity to other agents of a foreign state
than diplomats, but that the status of each class must be sepa-
rately judged in the light of the particular circumstances.
The importance of these considerations, and the present disposi-
tion to restrict the immunities of those in comparable categories
but the scope of whose immunities is not firmly established, is
revealed in the history of such international organizations as the
League of Nations and the United Nations. Two classes of in-
dividuals are involved, representatives of member states and
officials of the organizations, and their status differs. Representa-
tives of members who have diplomatic rank, even though not
accredited to a sovereign state, have been said to enjoy diplomatic
the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the send-
ing State;
(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the
receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific
relations."
18
"[0]ur diplomatic personnel are often required to live and work in
hostile lands where immunity is essential to their work and to their safety."
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, Hearings, supra, note 11, at 167.
so
privileges and immunities under international law. 14 This is not
unchallenged, 15 however, and in any case there is doubt regarding
the officials to be included in this class. Officials of international
organizations, which lack the capacity for legation, appear not to
be entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities in the absence
of treaty, 16 and the United States is said to have been particularly
adamant in its adherence to this view. 17
The Covenant of the League provided in Article 7 that "Repre-
sentatives of the Members of the League and officials of the
League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. ,, 18 The
Covenant, in according full diplomatic privileges and immunities
to representatives of members and officials of the League, followed
a pattern established in many prior treaties. The shift to the
functional approach to the problem of immunities, with a re-
sulting limitation in their scope, is reflected in the corresponding
provision of the Charter of the United Nations. Art. 105, para-
graph 2, provides : "Representatives of the Members of the United
Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the inde-
pendent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organi-
zation." The General Convention on Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations, 19 suggests that in the view of the General
Assembly the necessary immunities from criminal jurisdiction of
both representatives of members and officials are limited.20
The United States has not ratified the General Convention, and
14 Preuss, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of Agents Invested with
Functions of an International Interest," 25 A.J.I.L. 694, 699 (1931) ; Kunz,
"Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations," 41 A.J.I.L. 828,
843 (1947).
16 Article 89, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law and Comment b thereto,
p. 311.
10 Preuss, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 695.
17 Preuss, "The International Organizations Immunities Act," 40 A.J.I.L.
332, 333 (1946), citing the opinion given by the Department of State to the
British Embassy, 1 Foreign Rel. U.S. 414 (1929). See also Reporters'
Note 1 to the Introductory Note to Topic 4 of Chapter 4 of the Restatement,
Foreign Relations Law, p. 292.
18 For the manner in which this was implemented, see Preuss, op. cit.
supra, note 14, at 699; and Kunz, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 844.
19 1 U.N. Treaty Series 15 (1950).
20 See Articles V, VI and X. Members are placed under a duty to waive
the immunities accorded where they would impede the course of justice and
can be waived without prejudice to Members interests.
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in the host state the immunities of representatives of members
and officials of the United Nations depend primarily on the Head-
quarters Agreement 21 and the International Organizations Im-
munities Act.22 The Headquarters Agreement goes beyond the
requirements of the Charter and grants to resident representa-
tives and certain members of their staffs "the same privileges and
immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations,
as it accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it." 23 On the
other hand, the Headquarters Agreement makes no reference to
officials of the United Nations, and their immunity from criminal
jurisdiction. Under the International Organizations Immunities
Act it is strictly limited to that for official acts.24 Moreover, not
only are the benefits accorded by the Act subject to the require-
ment that the President prescribe the organization, and to the
President's power to withdraw, condition or limit such benefits,25
but the Secretary of State is given power to declare any individual
persona non grata.26
The limited immunity of United Nations officials under the Act
was further restricted in the Ranollo Case, a prosecution against
the chauffeur of the Secretary-General for speeding while driving
the Secretary-General to a conference with officials of the City of
New York on United Nations business.27 The court indicated it
would have accepted as conclusive a suggestion of the Department
21 61 Stat. 760 (1947), TIAS No. 1676.
22 59 Stat. 671 (1945), 22 U.S.C. Sec. 288d (1958). On the issue of
whether the Act implements completely the obligations of the United States
under the Charter, see Preuss, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 341.
28 Section 15.
24 Section 288 (d) (b) reads: "Representatives of foreign governments
in or to international organizations and officers and employees of such
organizations shall be immune from suit and legal process relating to acts
performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their func-
tions as such representatives, officers or employees except insofar as such
immunity may be waived by the foreign government or international
organization concerned." Section 288 e (c) adds that "No person shall, by
reason of the provisions of said sections, be considered as receiving
diplomatic status or as receiving any of the privileges incident thereto
other than such as are specifically set forth herein."
26 Section 288.
26 Section 288 (e). For a criticism of this grant of power to the Secretary
of State, see Preuss, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 339.
27 Westchester County v Ranollo, 187 Misc. 777, 67 N.Y. Supp. 2d 31, 41
A.J.I.L. 690 (1947), City Ct., New Rochelle, (1946).
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of State that the chauffeur was immune 28 but in the absence of
such advice undertook to decide the jurisdictional issue, and held
the chauffeur not immune. The case is interesting not so much
for its result as for the reasons given, particularly the emphasis
placed upon the "equal administration of justice" and the objec-
tion voiced to the creation of a "large preferred class within our
borders."
In summary, the history of the immunities accorded representa-
tives to and officials of the League of Nations and the United Na-
tions highlights the degree to which the personal immunity of
diplomats accredited to the territorial state is sui generis. It also
suggests that with respect to other agents of foreign governments
whose immunity is not firmly established, states are prepared to
accord only that immunity which is essential to the performance
of their specific functions. There is little disposition to group all
officials of a foreign government in the same class, and accord all
the same immunity, regardless of function.
OFFICIAL ACTS
A second major issue is whether an agent of a foreign govern-
ment who does not enjoy personal immunity may nevertheless
claim immunity with respect to acts done in the performance of
his official duties. It has been asserted that there is a general rule
of international law according such immunity 29 but there is much
reason to challenge that assertion.
28 The chauffeur's appointment had been duly notified to and accepted by
the Secretary of State, and the Legal Adviser had advised the Secretary-
General that in his opinion the chauffeur was entitled to the immunity.
Preuss, "Immunity of Officers and Employees of the United Nations for
Official Acts: The Ranollo Case," 41 A.J.I.L. 555, 556-57 (1947). On the issue
of the conclusiveness of a State Department certificate, see pp. 559-65, and
on the appropriateness of the jurisdictional issue being decided by the court,
see p. 573.
29 The Comment to Article 18 of the Draft Convention on Diplomatic
Privileges and Immunities, Harvard Research in International Law, 26
A.J.I.L. Supp. 15, 99 (1932) states that: "International law imposes upon
the courts of the receiving state an incompetence ratione materiae in the
case of public acts. * * *. Immunity for official acts, as the application of a
general principle of international law, and attaching to the intrinsic nature
of the acts themselves, does not constitute a part of 'exterritoriality' or
diplomatic immunity in the strict sense, which imposes upon the court an
incompetence ratione personae. It applies to all public acts, by whomsoever
performed, and to all state agents, whether diplomatic or otherwise." See to
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There is no such general principle of municipal law. The im-
munity of the state from suits by its citizens or subjects, if it
exists, does not imply, as a corollary, immunity for its agents.30
This rule of law is subject to qualification in the United Kingdom
"in the case of acts committed abroad against a foreigner." 31
This qualification is, however, concerned only with the jurisdic-
tion of the British courts with respect to Acts of State of agents
of the British Crown. It embodies a principle of British constitu-
tional law stemming from certain concepts regarding the separa-
tion of powers, rather than a rule of international law.32
Whether an agent of a foreign state is immune from the juris-
diction of the territorial sovereign is a quite different question.
The immunity, if it exists, is an extended application of the
doctrine that "every sovereign State is bound to respect the in-
the same effect Preuss, "Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical Basis of
Diplomatic Immunity," 10 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 170, 178-80 (1932).
The Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, asserts, however, in Comment C
to Article 69, p. 221 that: "Public ministers, officials or agents of a state do
not have immunity from personal liability, even for acts carried out in their
official capacity, unless the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to
enforce a rule against the foreign state or unless they have one of the
specialized immunities * * *."
80 In Johnstone v. Pedlar [1921], 2 A.C. 262, an action by a United States
citizen to recover money taken from him when he was arrested for illegal
drilling, the House of Lords rejected the defense of Act of State, Viscount
Finlay saying, at 271: "It is the settled law of this country, applicable as
much to Ireland as to England, that if a wrongful act has been committed
against the person or the property of any person, the wrongdoer cannot set
up as a defence that the act was done by the command of the Crown. The
Crown can do no wrong, and the Sovereign cannot be sued in tort, but the
person who did the act is liable in damages, as any private person would be."
See also Dicey, Conflict of Laws 163 (7th ed. 1958). Cf., Barr v. Matteo,
360 U.S. 564 (1959), i/oward v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
81 Viscount Finlay in Johnstone v. Pedlar, id., at 271. This dictum was
based on Buron v. Denman, [1848] L.R. 2 Ex. 167, 189, in which Commander
Denman, who had burned the Spanish plaintiff's slave ships and freed a
large number of slaves in territory on the West Coast of Africa, where
slavery was lawful, was sued in trespass in an English court. Baron Parke,
in leaving to the jury the issue of ratification of Denman's acts by the
British government, stated that ratification would give the plaintiff "a
remedy against the Crown only (such as it is) and actually exempts from
all liability the person who commits the trespass." See also 26 Halsbury's
Laws of England 251 (2d ed., 1937).
82 Mann, "The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State," 59 L.Q. Rev.
42,45 (1943).
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dependence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory." 33 The doctrine, so
broadly stated, has been increasingly attacked but has been re-
affirmed by the Supreme Court.34 To a substantial yet indefinable
degree it stems from notions regarding the separation of powers
and is hence to that degree a rule of municipal rather than of
international law.35 Usual application of the doctrine is in cases
in which the act of the foreign state is only indirectly involved,
as in litigation involving private rights alleged to have been
created by act of the foreign state. Critics have urged that, at
least as to Acts of State other than legislation or judgments, the
doctrine should be applied only where the Act of State "is done
subject to or is recognized by that legal system which governs
the legal relationship concerned," 36 in keeping with the approach
of private international law. The confiscation cases are hence
88 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ; see also 1 Lauter-
pacht-Oppenheim, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 267.
84 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 32 U.S.L. Week 4229 (Mar. 23,
1964). For criticism of the doctrine, see Mann, op. cit. supra, note 32, at
155; Zander, "The Act of State Doctrine," 53 A.J.I.L. 826 (1947); "Act of
State Immunity," 57 Yale L.J. 108 (1947) ; "A Reconsideration of the Act
of State Doctrine in United States Courts," a report of the Committee on
International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
May, 1959. See also Kingsberry, "The Act of State Doctrine," 4 A.J.I.L.
359 (1910); W. Harrison Moore, Act of State in English Law (1906). But
see Falk, Toward a Theory of Participation of Domestic Courts in the In-
ternational Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1961).
as
«The Act of State Doctrine is not of itself a rule of public international
law. In the United States the doctrine would appear to be largely a con-
sequence of judicial deference to the executive branch imposed by the separa-
tion of powers in our constitutional system. Public international law does
not prohibit the courts of one State from reviewing the validity of the acts
of a foreign government under international law." A Reconsideration of the
Act of State Doctrine in United States Courts, op. cit. supra, note 34, at 3.
This seems an overstatement; there would appear to be an obligation to
recognize a foreign act of state which is unexceptionable on any of the usual
grounds, e.g. is not contrary to the public policy of the forum, does not relate
to property or persons not within the foreign state. See Falk, op. cit. supra,
note 34, at 31. But see Comment g to Article 41, Restatement, Foreign Rela-
tions Law, p. 134 and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 32 U.S.L. Week
4229, 4235 (Mar. 23, 1964).
86 Mann, op. cit. supra, note 32, at 55. See also Comment b to Article 41,
Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 129.
35
explicable in terms of "the generally accepted principle of private
international law that the transfer of tangible property is subject
to the lex rei sitae * * *." 37 Private international law furnishes
no rule where criminal jurisdiction is involved, but the general
recognition in international law of the primacy of territorial
jurisdiction suggests a parallel approach.38
Where the criminal or tort liability of the agent of a foreign
state is involved, the application of the doctrine is again in a
sense indirect. Underhill v. Hernandez 39 is said, however, to have
established that in the American view the agent of a foreign state
does enjoy immunity—in that case from tort liability—for acts
done in the performance of his official duty,40 since the defendant
at the time of suit was no longer an agent of the foreign state,
Venezuela. The English view is said to be to the contrary.41 But
even if the decision in Underhill v. Hernandez is read as predi-
cating immunity on the official character of the defendant's act,
the question remains whether this does not depend on the fact the
act was done in Venezuela, not the United States, since the court's
rationale for its decision was "the immunity of individuals from
87 Mann, op. cit. supra, note 32, at 56.
88 That criminal jurisdiction may exist on other bases, e.g., nationality,
would seem not to destroy the parallel, since nationality is normally con-
sidered a secondary basis for jurisdiction and in any event is not the exclu-
sive basis. The common limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction on this basis
that the act must also be a crime where it occurs approaches though it does
not quite reach recognition that the law of the territorial state "governs
the legal relationship concerned."
89 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
40
"It would appear that in the United States the basis of this immunity
is ratione materiae rather than ratione personae and therefore immunity
persists in respect of earlier official acts after an official no longer holds
office. See Harvard Research Draft Convention on "Diplomatic Privileges
and Immunities," Article 18, A.J.I.L. Supp. 97 (1932) ; Hatch v. Baez, 7
Hun. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876)." A Reconsideration of the Act of State
Doctrine in United States Courts, op. cit. supra, note 34, at 9, n. 21.
41
"There cannot be any doubt that in this country, as in most others, the
opposite view prevails in practice and theory, and that, accordingly, it is the
personal position of the defendant, not the nature of the act the subject-
matter of the proceedings, that is of decisive importance. Nevertheless,
even in English law there is perhaps a certain inclination in some cases to
attribute immunity to the nature of the act." Mann, op. cit. supra, note 32
at 47. Mann refers to DiVischer's theory that it is the official act which is
entitled to immunity, based on the distinction increasingly drawn between
acts of sovereignty and acts done jure gestionis.
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suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own
state in the exercise of governmental authority * * *." 42 This is
not the same as saying that a question which should be deter-
mined by a careful balancing of the interests of states should turn
purely on the matter of territorial sovereignty. Rather the sug-
gestion is that, at least where criminal jurisdiction is concerned,
the place where the act occurred is of such significance that only
if it occurred outside the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction is
there any basis for application of the Act of State doctrine, stand-
ing alone. 43 Here, it should be noted that the notion of the
sanctity of Acts of State draws its strongest support from what
most would now consider an exaggerated view of the significance
of territorial sovereignty.44 In the cases following Underhill, the
American courts have commonly restated the doctrine in terms
which include the element that the act occurred in the foreign
state.45 Of more importance is that "except where constrained by
43 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). (Emphasis added.)
48 In the latter case there may still be occasion for balancing the opposing
interests of the state concerned, as when the agent of the foreign state, e.g.
a member of its armed forces, is a national of another state, and the latter
state seeks to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of nationality.
44
"The fundamental reason why persuading a sovereign power to do this
or that cannot be a tort is not that the sovereign cannot be joined as a
defendant or because it must be assumed to be acting lawfully. * * * The
fundamental reason is that it is a contradiction in terms to say that within
its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign power to bring about a
result that it declares by its conduct to be desirable and proper. It does
not, and foreign courts cannot, admit that the influences were improper
or the results bad. It makes the persuasion lawful by its own act. The
very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law."
Mr. Justice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347,358 (1909).
45 Ricaud v. American Metal Company, Ltd., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) ; The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276 (2d
Cir. 1920) ; Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 114
F. 2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947) ; United States ex rel Von Heymann
v. Watkins, 159 F. 2d 650 (2d Cir. 1947) ; United States ex rel Steinworth v.
Watkins, 159 F. 2d 50 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Pasos v. Pan American Airways,
229 F. 2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372 (1923) ; Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co.
of New York, 262 N.Y. 220 (1933) ; see also A. M. Luther v. James Sagor
and Co., [1921] 1 K.B. 456. Cf. Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 Fed. 367 (2d Cir.
1918), in which the doctrine is stated in terms of "the acts of a foreign
nation performed in its sovereign capacity." But the act in question was the
37
an international agreement requiring them to give extraterritorial
effect to a foreign act of State, * * * United States courts have
felt free to deny effect, as inconsistent with the public policy of
the forum, to foreign acts of State purporting to affect a person
or res not within the territorial jurisdiction of the acting State at
the time of the act in question. The Act of State Doctrine there-
fore is concerned only with acts of State operating directly on
persons or property within the territorial jurisdiction of the
acting State." 46 The fighting issue has been whether a court of
the forum could deny effect to a foreign Act of State even though
it affected a person or res within the forum's territorial jurisdic-
tion, on the ground it was inconsistent with the public policy of
the forum. The New York Court of Appeals has felt free to do
so,
47 and the Second Circuit's decision in Bernstein v. Van Hey-
ghen Freres Societe Anonyme 48 has been severely criticized be-
payment in Ecuador into an account in the Bank of Ecuador of moneys
claimed to be subject to a prior lien.
The holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino was carefully
limited, the court stating that "* * * we decide only that the Judicial Branch
will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own terri-
tory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this
government at the time of suit * * *." 32 U.S.L. Week 4229, 4238 (Mar. 23,
1964). (Emphasis added.;
46
"A Reconsideration of the Act of State Doctrine in United States
Courts," op. cit. supra, note 34, at 425, citing U.S. v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co.,
280 N.Y. 286 (1938), aff'd 309 U.S. 624 (1940) ; Vladikavkazsky Railway Co.,
v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369 (1934) ; Plesch v. Banque Nationale de
la Republique d'Haiti, 273 App. Div. 224, aff'd per curiam, 298 N.Y. 573
(1948). Bollack v. Societe Generale, 263 App. Div. 601 (1942); Zwack v.
Kraus Bros. & Co., 133 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y., 1955) aff'd in part, 237
F. 2d 255 (2dCir., 1956).
Mann, op. cit. supra, note 32, at 170, 171 states: "If, for one reason or
another, an English court were precluded from opposing its principles of
justice and morality to foreign acts of State, logic might necessitate the
conclusion that foreign confiscatory legislation must also be allowed extra-
territorial effect so as to comprise property situate in this country. English
Courts have shrunk from arriving at so extraordinary a result." Mann
cites also decisions of the Rumanian and Swedish Supreme Courts.
" Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533 (1953).
See also Vladikavkazsky Railway Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369
(1943) ; Sokoloft v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158 (1924) ; Second Rus-
sian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 297 F. 404 (2d Cir., 1924) ; Zwack v. Kraus Bros.
& Co., 237 F. 2d 255 (2d Cir., 1956) ; cf. A.M. Luther v. James Sagor and
Co. [1921] 1 K.B. 456.
48 163 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir., 1947).
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cause it did not. 49 There would seem to be no need to argue that
an act which is in violation of its criminal law is contrary to the
public policy of a state.
The cases involving tort or criminal jurisdiction with respect to
acts of agents of a foreign government committed in the receiving
state suggest there is no immunity with regard to such acts
merely because they were done in the performance of official duty.
The leading case, Regina v. Leslie, 50 concerned the master of an
English merchant vessel who, under a contract with the Chilean
government, carried certain Chileans, banished by the Chilean
government, from Valparaiso to Liverpool. The court drew a
sharp distinction between the performance of official acts within
and without the territory of the state of which the defendant was
an agent, 51 and affirmed a conviction for false imprisonment for
detaining the deportees after the vessel left Chilean waters. On
virtually identical facts, involving a deportation from Hawaii, by
order of President Dole, on a British vessel, the Divisional Court
of British Columbia held the captain and owner liable in tort.52 A
""'Acts of State' Immunity," 57 Yale L.J. 108 (1947). But see Banco
National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F. 2d 845, 859, (2d Cir., 1962).
Reversed on other grounds, 32 U.S.L. Week 4229 (Mar. 23, 1964).
60 Court of Criminal Appeals, 1860, 8 Cox Crim. Cas. 269 (1860) ; Restate-
ment (Second), Conflict of Laivs, par. 43 f, Comment f, Illustration 7 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1956) is expressly to the contrary.
si
"We assume that the government could justify all that it did within its
own territory, and we think it follows that the defendant can justify all
that he did there as agent for the Government, and under its authority.
* * * The further question remains, can the conviction be sustained for
that which was done out of the Chilean territory? and we think that it can.
It is clear that an English ship on the high seas, out of any foreign terri-
tory, is subject to the laws of England, and persons, whether foreign or
English, on board such ship are as much amenable to English law as they
would be on English soil. * * * [F]or an English ship the laws of Chile
out of the state are powerless and the lawfulness of the acts must be tried
by English law." Regina v. Leslie, supra, note 50, at 277-78. But see Rex v.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [1947] 2 All E.R. 550, [1947] Ann.
Dig. 69 (No. 23). Compare Dick v. United States Lines Co., 38 F. Supp. 685
(S.D. N.Y., 1941), holding a seaman could properly be confined by the ship's
officers in a foreign port at the direction of officials of the littoral state.
62 Cranstoun v. Bird, [1896] 4 B.C. 569. The Court said, at 581-82:
"The admission can mean no more than this, that a lawful order was
made in Hawaii to carry the plaintiff in a lawful manner to Vancouver,
and in an Hawaiian ship the order might probably have been lawfully car-
ried out. No international law, as it seems to me, has any operation on the
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dictum in Vavasscur v. Krupp is to the same effect, distinguishing
a case involving a personal sovereign from one involving his
agents.53
Across the board, there is too much authority to the contrary
to warrant the conclusion that there is a general rule of interna-
tional law, based on such abstract principles as the equality and
independence of States, according immunity to any agent of a
foreign government for any act done in the performance of duty.
Where the immunity is recognized, it appears to be based pri-
marily—as is personal immunity—on the need to protect the
agent in the performance of his functions, and, indirectly, the
state he serves in the conduct of its affairs. One factor in
that quite flexible concept appears to be the status of the
agent, so that personal immunity and immunity for official acts
in a sense overlap. A second basic for the immunity may be fair-
ness, i.e., the feeling that it is unfair to place a man in the
dilemma of having to choose between conflicting duties.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations accords im-
munity to certain officials not entitled to personal immunity.54 It
is clear, however, that this is not responsive to a view that a
general rule of international law requires this result. Rather it
case. An English captain of an English ship outside Hawaiian jurisdiction
commits a trespass, and Hawaiian law or acts of that Government cannot
justify the trespass in an English court. No doubt in an Hawaiian court
it would or might be otherwise, and this shows that Buron v. Denman, 2
Ex. 167, has no application."
68 German shells, said to infringe English patents, were brought into Eng-
land by the Mikado to be placed on a Japanese warship. The patentee ob-
tained an injunction against the agents of the Mikado restraining them
from removing the shells. The Mikado applied to be made and was made a
defendant and an order was issued that, notwithstanding the injunction, he
could remove the shells. Brett, L. J., in the course of his opinion, said: "If
it is an infringement of the patent by the Mikado, you cannot sue him for
that infringement. If it is an infringement by the agents, you may sue the
agents for that infringement, but then it is the agents whom you sue."
Vavasseur v. Krupp, [1878] 9 Ch. D. 351, 358.
84 Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra, note
8, provides that:
"1. Except insofar as additional privileges and immunities may be
granted by the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is a national
of or permanently resident in that state shall enjoy only immunity from
jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts performed in the
exercise of his functions.
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was motivated by the opinion that there is a functional basis for
according the immunity.55 Moreover, immunity even for acts done
in the performance of official duty is expressly negatived in other
instances. This is clear recognition that no rule of international
law requires according the immunity to all officials of a foreign
government. 56
The foregoing suggests, as guidelines in appraising the claim
that a member of an armed force is entitled to personal immunity,
these considerations
:
(1) There is no general rule according personal immunity to
the agents of a foreign state, and the great majority of such
agents enjoy no immunity.
(2) There is a discernible tendency to limit immunities of
agents of a state to those necessary, in a quite strict sense, to the
exercise of their functions, and there is a correlative emphasis
on waiver.
(3) The established immunity of diplomats accredited to a
state is of limited significance as an analogy because; (a) it has
deep historical roots, including the discredited fiction of extra-
territoriality of embassies
;
(b) it depends in part on accreditation
and its corollaries, which provide an independent sanction; and
(c) it depends largely on the peculiarly close relationship between
the diplomat and the state to which he is accredited.
Regarding the claim that an agent of a foreign state is entitled
66 Commentary (c) to Article 37 of the Draft Articles on "Diplomatic
Intercourse and Immunities," Report, International Law Commission, U.N.,
10th Session, 28 April-4 July, 1958. G.A., 13th Session, Supp. No. 9
(A/3859), notes that: "The majority * * * considered it essential for a
diplomatic agent who is a national of the receiving state to enjoy at least a
minimum of immunity to enable him to perform his duties satisfactorily.
That minimum, it was felt, was inviolability, and also immunity from
jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his
functions * * *."
6
* Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra, note
8, provides
:
"2. Other members of the staff of the mission and private servants
who are nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall
enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted by the re-
ceiving State."
But those not nationals or residents of the receiving States who are mem-
bers of the administrative and technical staffs of a mission enjoy personal
immunity, and members of the service staff immunity in respect of acts per-
formed in the course of their duties. (See also Article 37 of the Convention.)
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to immunity with respect to acts done in the performance of duty,
the situation is much less clear. There is some doubt that the Act
of State doctrine extends to acts done outside the state of which
the accused is an agent, and in any event the reach of the doctrine
is likely to be limited strictly in terms of the need for protecting
the agent in the performance of his duties.

